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Evaluating alternative monetary policy rules 
Abstract 
This paper examines monetary policy from an optimal control perspective. Five loss 
functions arc minimized for each of five models, and the results are compared. The basic 
(‘true’) loss function targets inRation and unemployment. The other loss functions target, 
respectively, i&l&ion alone, unemployment alone, nominal growth alone, and real growth 
alone. The five models are fvfo small ~trwtural models, two VAR models, and a large 
structural model. A numerical procedure is presented that c&o handle a variety of loss 
functions and models. 
Key war& Monetary rules; Optimal Fed behavior 
1. Iotwduction 
There is a large and growing literature on determining the best monetary 
policy rule for the Federal Reserve.’ The general approach in this literature is 
to I) choose a policy instrument usually the monetay base, Ml, M2, or a 
short-term interest rate, 2) choose a target variable - such as nominal GDP 
and a rule, and 3) examine, using a model of the economy, how the economy 
would have behaved under the rule versus how it in fact behaved. The rule 
typically expresses the policy instrument as a function of the deviation of the 
174 R.C Fair, EP Xomy,Joumal of M”nerary ECO”“rniC,5 38 (iY96, 173-191 
target variable from its target value. Usually the actual values of the variances 
of key macroeconomic variables like the real growth rate and the rate of infk- 
tion are compared to the values of the variances that would have occurred had 
the rule been followed. The aim is to find the rule (including the choice of the 
target variable) that gives (in some sense) the best overall performance of the 
eclXKltlly. 
The general question of determining the best monetary policy rule of the Fed 
is an obvious one to examine using optimal control techniques, but with the 
exception of Feldstein and Stock (1993), the literature has not been concerned 
with solving optimal control problems and deriving optimal monetary policy rules. 
In this paper we examine monetary policy from an optimal control perspective. 
Our general procedure is as follows. 
First, we choose a particular loss function and awune that everyone (including 
the Fed) agrees that this is the loss function whose expected value the Fed should 
minimize. Call this the ‘true’ loss function. Second, we choose a policy instrument 
and use this instrument to minimize the expected value of the true loss function. 
Third, we use the instrument to minimize the expected value of other, simpler 
loss functions (such as one that targets only nominal GDP). Finally, we compare 
the different outcomes to see how close the minimization of the expected value 
of the simpler loss functions comes to the minimization of the expected value 
of the true loss function. We also compare the outcomes to the actual, historical 
outcome to see how much better the economic performance would have been had 
the Fed behaved by minimizing the expected value of the particular loss function 
in question. We use five different models for these results: two small structural 
models, two VAR models, and a large structural model. The policy instrument 
for one of the small structural models and for one of the VAR models is the 
money supply (M2), and the policy instrument for the other three models is the 
three-month Treasuy bill rate. The VAR models are essentially two versions of 
the same model, one with an equation for the money supply and one with an 
equation for the bill rate. 
Our results allow us to examine how much is lost by targeting, for example, 
only nominal GDP. If the results of minimizing the expected value of the loss 
function that targets only nominal GDP are close to the results of minimizing the 
expected value of the true loss function, then the recommendation some studies 
have made that only nominal GDP should be targeted may be worth considering 
on grounds of simplicity. If, on the other hand, the results are not close, then the 
recommendation should probably be rejected. The same holds for targeting only 
real GDP, only inflation, and only unemployment. 
The control period is 1962: l-1993:2 (126 quarters). The target value for each 
of the various target variables in the loss functions is taken to be the mean of 
the actual values of the variable over the control period. The focus in this paper. 
as in much of the literature, is on variances and not means, and having the target 
values be the mean values is a way of eliminating mean effects. 
The loss functions and control problems are discussed in Section 2, and the 
procedure for solving the control problems is explained in Section 3. The models 
are then discussed in Sections 4, 5, and 6, and the results are presented in Section 
7. Finally, Section 8 discusses how stochastic simulation might be used in future 
work, and Section 9 concludes with some other suggestions for future research. 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that the optima1 control approach is not 
without criticism. Some have argued that monetary policy rules should be robust 
in the sense of working well across a variety of models. This may not be true 
of a role derived by minimizing the expected value of a loss function using 
a particular model, since the rule is obviously model-specific. The robustness \ 
property would be a good one if the models in question were all equally likely 
of being the best approximation of the economy. If, however, all models but, 
say, one were poor approximations, one would want to find a rule that worked 
well on the good model regardless of how it worked on the other models. 
The literature to date has worked with very small models, and it does not seem 
likely that any of them is a good approximation. The large s~~chual model con- 
sidered in this paper has been extensively tested, and it seems (to us) to be much 
more likely to be a good approximation than are the other four models consid- 
ered here and similar models in the literature. We thus put much more weight in 
this paper on the results using the large model, and we are not concerned with 
how the (implicit) rule for the large model might work for the small models. 
The main reason for including the results for the small models in this paper is to 
have a reference point to the previous literature, which, as just noted, has only 
been concerned with small models. 
Another criticism of the optimal control approach is that it is time-inconsistent 
if expectations are rational. This is, of course, a problem for any rule, not just a 
rule derived from the solution of an optimal control problem. Some precommit- 
ment technology is needed to avoid this problem, and this is true whether the 
rule is optimal or whether it is chosen in some other way. 
Finally, the work in this paper is based on the assumption that the parameters 
of the models do not change as policy rules change. Regarding the large model, it 
is argued in Fair (1994) that if changing policy rules cause important parameter 
changes, the model should not do well in the various tests that were performed 
on it. The model in fact does reasonably well in the tests. 
2. The loss functions and control problems 
Let X, denote the log of nominal GDP, Y, the log of real GDP, and P, the log 
of the GDP price index, where X, = P, + Yr and where the t subscript refers to 
period f.’ Denote the growth rates as: XI =400(X,-X,+,), y, = 4OO(Y, - Y,_,), 
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and pI = 4OO(P, ~ Pt_,). The differences are multiplied by 400 to put the 
growth rates at annual rates in percentage points. Let U{ denote the level of the 
unemployment rate, and let x*, y*, p*, and U* denote the target values of x,, y,, 
pi, and U,, respectively, where, as noted above, the target values are the means 
of the historical values over the control period. Finally, let Lit be the loss in 
period t associated with variable j deviating from its target, where j is either I, 
JJ, p, or U. Lj, is postulated to be 
L,,, = (ji ~ j’ )‘. (I) 
As noted in the Introduction, we consider two policy instruments in this paper, 
M2 and the three-month Treasury bill rate. Let Mi denote the log of M2, and let 
m, denote its growth rate: m, = 4OO(M, ~ MT_,). Let R, denote the level of the 
three-month Treasury bill rate. In the following analysis we will use a measure 
of the cost associated with changing the policy instrument. The cost in period t, 
denoted D,,, where z is either m or R, is postulated to be 
DZi = (it - zt-,)*. (2) 
When m is the policy instrument, the ‘true’ loss in period t is postulated to be 
Hr = O.SL,,, + OSLO, + zDmr + 
0.1 0.1 




where m; is equal to ml if m, is greater than -2.0 and to -2.0 otherwise and 
m; is equal to m, if m, is less than 21.0 and to 21.0 otherwise. When R is the 
policy instrument, the ‘true’ loss in period t is postulated to he 
Hr = OSL,, + OSL, + nDRi + 
0.1 0.1 
R; - 1.999 + 16.001 -R;’ (4) 
where R, is equal to R, if R, is greater than 2.0 and to 2.0 otherwise and R; is 
equal to R, if R, is less than 16.0 and to 16.0 otherwise. 
The third, fourth, and fifth terms in Eqs. (3) and (4) require some explanation. 
Consider first the third term, and assume that the control period of interest is 
I through 7. For each control problem solved in this paper we have chosen 
a so that the value of c:i,Dzr using the optimal values of z is close to the 
value using the historical values of z (where z is either m or R). We have 
thus constrained the problem so that the period-to-period variation in the policy 
instrument as measured by C:=, Dzr is roughly the same in the optimal solution 
as it is historically. We are taking the actual value of C:=, Dzl as the maximum 
amount of variation in the policy instrument that the Fed allows, and we are 
thus constraining each solution to have roughly no more variation than this. 
Without this type of constraint, the solutions sometimes have huge period-to- 
period changes in the policy instrument, and it is not sensible to think that the 
Fed would ever behave in this extreme way. The Fed undoubtedly assigns coots 
to changing policy instruments, which is what our treatment is doing. 
The fourth and fifth terms in Eq. (3) insure that the optimal values of m will be 
between -2.0 and 21.0. The range of m in the control period is - 1.34 to 20.34, 
and so the fourth and fifth terms keep m roughly within its historical range. We 
are taking this range to be the maximum that the Fed allows. Similarly, the fourth 
and fifth terms in Eq. (4) insure that the optimal values of R will be between 
2.0 and 16.0. The range of R in the control period is 2.72 to 15.09, and so the 
fourth and fifth terms keep R roughly within its historical range. 
The main feature of Eqs. (3) and (4) is that we are taking the true loss to be ’ 
deviations of unemployment and inflation from their targets. The Fed is assumed 
in the final analysis to care only about these two variables (except for the cost 
of changing the policy instroment). As an approximation. this does not seem an 
unreasonable assumption, but it would be easy in future work to have the true loss 
depend on more variables. We do need, however, to make some assumption about 
the true loss in order to have a basis for comparison of alternative policy rules. 
The other loss timctions tried are one that targets only inflation [the first two 
terms in (3) and (4) replaced by L,,], one that targets only unemployment [the 
first rwo terms in (3) and (4) replaced by &], one that targets only nominal 
growth [the first two terms in (3) and (4) replaced by L,,], and one that targets 
only real growth [the first two terms in (3) and (4) replaced by L,,,]. 
As noted above, the control period of interest is 1 through T, where I is 1962:l 
and T is 1993:2. However, in order not to have to assume that life ends in T, the 
control problem should be thought of as one of minimizing the expected value of 
Cf=$ Hi. where n is chosen to be large enough to avoid unusual end-of-horizon 
effects near T. The overall control problem should thus be thought of as choosing 
the values of m or R that minimize the expected value of C:y,n~, subject to 
the model used. 
3. The solution procedure 
If a model is linear and the objeaive tin&m quadratic, it is possible to derive 
analytically optimal feedback equations for the control variables.’ In general, 
however, optimal feedback equations cannot be derived for nonlinear models 
or for objective functions with nonlinear constraints on the instruments, and a 
numerical procedure must be used. The following procedure was used for the 
results in this paper. It is based on a sequence of solutions of deterministic 
control problems. 
The aim is to approximate the T values of z, denoted z;, ,zf, that would 
have been chosen had it been possible to derive analytically an optimal feedback 
equation for z. Given information at the beginning of period 1, the overall optimal 
control problem is to minimize the expected value of C:=:“H, subject to the 
model. As noted above, although n is used here to avoid end-of-horizon problems, 
in the final analysis we are only interested in the values of the control variable 
through T. 
For purposes of solving the control problems, the Fed is assumed to know the 
model (its structure and coefficient estimates). This is more than the Fed would 
have known historically because the model was developed after the first quarter 
of the control period and is estimated through the end of the control period. 
On the other hand, the Fed is assumed not to know the future values of any 
endogenous variable, any exogenous variable, or any error term when solving 
the control problems. The optimal path of z is something the Fed could have 
achieved had it had knowledge of the model. 
The procedure for solving the overall control problem is as follows: 
1. If the model has exogenous variables, which the large stmctural model con- 
sidered in this paper has, add estimated autoregressive exogenous-variable 
equations to the model, so that the model has in effect no exogenous vari- 
ables. [For the large structural model this is Model US+ in Fair (1994).] 
Set all the error terms to zero (their expected values), including the errors 
in the exogenous-variable equations, for periods 1 through k, where k is the 
length of the horizon for the first solution. Choose values of z for periods I 
through k that minimize C:_, Hz subject to the model with the error terms 
set to zero. This is just a deterministic optimal control problem, which can 
be solved, for example, by the method in Fair (1974).4 Let 2; denote the 
optimal value of z for period 1 that results from this solution. The value 
of k should be chosen to be large enough so that making it larger has a 
negligible effect on 2;. zf is a value that the Fed could have computed at the 
beginning of period I (assuming the model were known) having knowledge 
of the endogenous-variable values, the exogenous-variable values, and the 
error terms only up to, but not including, period l.5 
2. Drop the exogenous-variable equations, and set the error terms in the struc- 
tural equations for period 1 equal to their historical values. Solve this version 
of the model for period 1 using zf instead of its actual value and using the 
actual values of all the other exogenous variables. (This is just a determin- 
istic simulation for period 1.) The solution values from this simulation are 
what the model estimates would have occurred historically in period 1 had 
the Fed chosen z; and had the exogenous-variable values and error terms 
been what they were historically. 
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for periods 2 through T. For an arbitrary period S, use 
the solution values of all endogenous variables for periods s - I and back, 
as well as the values of z,‘_, and back. 
The solution values of the endogenous variables carried along from period to 
period in the above procedure are estimates of what the economy would have 
been like had the Fed chosen z;, ,z; and had the exogenous-variable values 
and error terms been what they were historically. Given knowledge of the model, 
these are values that the Fed could have achieved. Note that once z;, _. ,z; are 
chosen, the solution values for periods 1 through T can be generated all at once. 
This can be done by 1) dropping the exogenous-variable equations, 2) setting 
the structural error terms to their historical values, 3) using the actual values of 
all the exogenous variables (except z), 4) using z;... .,z;, and then 5) solving 
the model for periods 1 through T. These are the values referred to below as 
‘solution values’. Note that these values are not the Fed’s expected values after it 
has made its decision each period. The Fed’s expected values are based on the use 
of the exogenous-variable equations and zero values of the error terms, whereas 
the solution values are based on the actual values of the exogenous variables 
(except the policy instrument) and error terms. The results of minimizing the 
expected value of each of the five loss functions for each of the five models are 
presented in Table 1 later in the article. 
4. Two small struchual models 
Money instrument Model S(m) 
Model S(m) consists of a simple aggregate demand equation,6 a Phillips curve, 
a variant of Okun’s law, and the identity relating x,, yi, and P,: 
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The estimated system, using the sample period 1960:1&1993:2, is shown below. 
Parameter estimates were obtained by the method of iterated three-stage least 
squares (3SLS) with the predetermined variables x,+,, m,_,, PI+,. ~1-2, JJ_-~, 
Uti,,, and UC+2 as instrumental variables for the second and third equations. 
(Absolute values of t-statistics arc given in parentheses.) 
J, =3.00+0.190~,~, +0.425m,_l, (9) 
(3.65) (2.38) (4.55) 
SE = 3.62, D w = 2.06, 
p, = 1.65 +0.479&1 + O.l65p,+z +0.321~,+3 ~ 0.2430;, (IO) 
(3.85) (5.94) (1.85) (3.93) (3.37) 
SE = 1.19, DW = 2.00, 
L: - b;:,, =0.355 + 0.335U,+, - 0.362U+2 ~ O.O44y, - O.Ol5y,_l, (11) 
(5.12) (4.68) (4.94) (4.11) (2.67) 
SE = 0.19, DW = 2.06. 
Several properties of this system should be noted. First, the estimated system is 
dynamically stable in the variables n, p, and U, with characteristic roots 0.958 1 !t 
O.l072i, -0.2514 + 0.3139i, 0.3779, and 0.1896. Second, the data do not reject 
the accelerationist form of the Phillips curve (p2 + p3 + fi_~ = I), with a x2 value 
of 0.59 (p-value = 0.44), but do reject the growth-rate form of Okun’s law 
(y4 = -ys), with a x2 value of 5.97 (p-value = 0.01). 
The mean of the vector (x p U) as a function of the mean of m is given by 
(~)=(~;z)+jiEK$ (12) 
where fi denotes the mean. It follows from this that a one percentage point 
increase in the growth rate of the money supply will in the long run increase the 
growth rate of real output by 0.03 percentage points (0.52-0.49) and decrease the 
unemployment rate by 0.07 percentage points. The model thus exhibits modest 
monetary nonneutrality in the long nm. 
As for all the models, the results for Model S(m) are based on the solution of 
126 deterministic optimal control problems for each of the five loss fun&xx. The 
value of k used for the optimizations for the four small models was 16 quarters. 
The value of I( in Eqs. (3) and (4) that was used for Model S(m) was 0.015. All 
the calculations for the four small models were done using the RATS program. 
Interest rate instrument - Model S(R) 
Model S(R) is the same as Model S(m) except that Eq. (5) is replaced by 
y, = x, + az.k-1 + vR,-, + Gil. (13) 
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The same procedures were used for Model S(R) as were used for Model S(m). 
The predetermined variables _I+,. &I, P,-,, .P-?, pI_,: UC_,, and G-2 were 
used as instmmental variables for Eqs. (6) and (7). The estimated system, using 
the sample period 1954:lkl993:2, is 
J+ = 3.77 + 0.283?;,_, - 0.288R,_,, (14) 
(5.36) (3.X5) (2.87) 
sl? = 3.83, DW = 2.09, 
p,= 1.45 + 0.429p,_, + 0.2OOp,_2 + 0.282+3 - 0.174'.& (15) 
(3.30) (5.72) (2.50) (3.71) (2.30) 
SE = 1.34, DW = 1.84, 
r;, - o;_i =0.495 + 0.332ci,_, ~ 0.368(/,_2 - 0.084yr - O.O07y,_,, (16) 
(7.08) (5.50) (5.80) (6.76) (1.09) 
SE = 0.25, DW = 2.18. 
The characteristic roots are 0.9510,0.9416. ~0.2612+0.4783i, 0.3910, and 0.2834, 
which indicate that the model is stable. The accelerationist form of the Phillips 
curve is rejected at the 0.10 but not the 0.05 level, with a ;I’ value of 3.41 (p- 
value = 0.06). The growth-rate form of Okun’s law is rejected, with a ;r’ value 
of 7.45 (p-value = 0.01). The mean of the vector (JJ p L’) as a function of the 
mean of R is given by 
The value of I used was 0.250. 
5. Two VAR models 
Model V(nt) consists of four equations, one each for x, p. LT. and R, where 
the right-hand-side variables consist of a constant and three lags each of x_ p, U, 
R, and m. The same sample periods and procedures were used here as were used 
above except that the estimation technique was ordiway least squares instead of 
3SLS. The value of I used was 0.015. 
Interest rate instrument - Model Y(R) 
Model V(X) is the same as Model V(m) except that the equation for R is 
replaced by an equation for m. The right-hand-side variables are the same, and 
6. A large structural model - Model L(R) 
Model L(R) is presented in Fair (1994). It is quarterly and consists of 30 
stochastic equations and 101 identities. It was estimated by two-stage least squares 
over the 1954:1-1993:2 period. The following is a brief discussion of the 
properties of the model that are relevant for present purposes.’ Remember that 
the model is based on the assumption that expectations are not rational and the 
assumption that the parameters of the stmctural equations do not change when 
policy rules change. 
There are six sectors in the model: household, firm, financial, foreign, state 
and local government, and federal government. All the flows of funds among 
these sectors and all balance-sheet constraints are accounted for in the model. 
This is done by linking the national income and product accounts and the flow 
of funds accounts. The sum of the savings across the six sectors is zero; some 
sector’s expense is some other sector’s revenue. Also, one sector’s financial asset 
is some other sector’s financial liability. Accounting for all flows of funds means 
that there is an explicit Fed open market operations variable in the model, the 
amount of federal government securities outstanding. This is the main ‘tool’ of the 
Fed. The other two tools are the resewe requirement rate and the discount rate. 
The basic version of the model includes an interest rate reaction function of 
the Fed, which is estimated. This is the monetary policy rule that the Fed is 
estimated to have followed over the period. The three-month Treasury bill rate is 
OD the left-hand side of this equation and variables that are assumed to affect Fed 
behavior are on the right-hand side. In this version of the model the money supply 
is endogenous; the Fed through open market operations each quarter achieves the 
bill rate implied by this equation. 
Two term structure equations in the model link the bill rate to two long- 
term interest rates, a bond rate and a mortgage rate, where the long rates are a 
function of the current and lagged bill rates. The bill rate thus affects long-tam 
rates through these term structure equations. 
There are four household expenditure equations in the model, explaining 
1) consumption of services, 2) consumption of nondurables, 3) consumption of 
durables, and 4) residential investment. There is also an import equation. Interest 
rates appear as explanatory variables in these equations the bill rate in the 
services equation and the mortgage rate in the others. (The bill rate is taken 
as a proxy for short-term rates in general, and the mortgage rate is taken as a 
proxy for long-term rates in general.) The coefficient estimates of the interest rate 
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variables are all negative (and significant except in the import equation). There 
is also a nonresidential fixed investment equation in the model, and the bond 
rate appears in this equation with a negative and significant coefficient estimate. 
Therefore, through this part of the specification a decrease in interest rates in- 
creases household expenditures and nonresidential fixed investment and increases 
imports. The increase in imports is not large enough to offset the other increases, 
so that through this part of the specification there is a net increase in the demand 
for domestic goods in the model when interest rates fall. 
The bond rate also appears in a stock price equation, where a decrease in the 
bond rate has a positive effect on stock prices. The value of stocks is part of 
household wealth, and household wealth (lagged once) appears as an explana- 
tory variable in two of the four household expenditure equations with positive 
estimated coefficients. A decrease in interest rates thus has a positive effect on 
household expenditures through stock prices. 
Disposable income appears in the household expenditure equations and in the 
import equation. The net effect of an increase in disposable income on the demand 
for domestic goods is positive - the positive effect from the expenditure equations 
outweighs the negative effect from the import equation. Since interest receipts of 
households arc part of income, a decrease in interest rates (and thus interest 
receipts) has a negative effect on income and thus on demand through this part 
of the specification. This negative effect is not large enough to offset completely 
the positive effects discussed above, and the total effect on output from a fall in 
interest rates is positive. 
The following is a summary of how a decrease in the bill rate affects the 
economy according to the model: 
I. Long-term rates fall over time through the term structure equations. 
2. Stock prices rise, which is a rise in household wealth. 
3. Interest payments of the federal government fall, which leads to a fall in 
interest receipts of the household sector and thus, other things being equal, 
household income. 
4. The fall in interest rates and rise in wealth have a positive effect on expen- 
ditures on domestic goods, and the fall in income from the fall in interest 
receipts has a negative effect. The net effect is positive. 
The price level is a nonlinear function of, among other things, the difference 
behveen potential output and actual output, a measure of demand pressure. As 
output approaches 4 percent above potential, the price level approaches infinity. 
The price of imports also has an important effect on the domestic price level. 
The unemployment rate is determined as one minus the ratio of employment 
to the labor force. There are three labor force participation equations for the 
household sector, one for each of three agcsex groups, that determine the labor 
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force, and there is a demand for labor equation for the firm sector that determines 
most of employment. 
When the optimal control problems were solved, the estimated interest rate 
reaction function of the Fed was dropped from the model, and the interest rate 
determined by this equation (the three-month Treasury bill rate) was taken to be 
the control variable, i.e., the policy instnunent. This means that the open market 
operations variable of the Fed, the amount of government securities outstanding, 
is endogenous; its value each quarter is whatever is needed to achieve the desired 
value of the bill rate. 
The solution of the 126 deterministic optimal control problems for each loss 
function took about 12 hours on a Pentium 90 computer for Model L(R). To 
save computer time, the value of k used for the optimizations was taken to be 8 
quarters instead of 16 quarters used for the small models. Some experimentation 
suggested that a value of k of 8 was large enough for the addition of more 
quarters to have a fairly small effect on the optimal value of R for the first 
quarter. The value of c( used was 0.500. All the calculations for the model were 
done using the Fair-Parke program. 
7. Discussion of the results 
The results are presented in Table 1. Consider first the values in the ‘Actual’ 
row versus the values obtained by minimizing the expected value of the true loss 
function, which are in the first nxv for each model. Remember that the true loss 
function weights inflation and unemployment equally. When the expected value 
of this loss function is minimized for Model L(R), the unemployment loss (Qu) 
falls from 1.59 to 0.92, but the inflation loss (Qp) actually rises (from 2.41 to 
2.62). The other four models have both inflation loss and unemployment loss 
falling. Model S(R) is closest to Model L,(R) in that the fall in the inflation loss 
is small relative to the fall in the unemployment loss. 
Consider next how tlx policy of targeting only nominal growth (x) does com- 
pared to the policy of minimizing the expected value of the true loss function.x 
For Model L(R) the increase in Qp.cr when only nominal growth is targeted is 
16.3 percent (from I.Y6 to 2.28). The other percentage increases are 12.6 for 
Model S(m), 3.8 for Model S(R), 10.8 for Model V(m), and 13.0 for Model 
V(R). All models except S(R) thus show a noticeable increase in loss when only 
nominal growth is targeted, with the largest increase for L(R). 
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The policy of targeting only inflation (p) works well for the four small models 
in that for each model the value of Q,,,r: when only p is targeted is fairly close 
to the value when the true loss function is minimized. This is not true, however; 
for L(R). Conversely, the policy of targeting only unemployment (U) works well 
for L(R) in that the value of Q,,.r: when only U is targeted is fairly close to the 
value when the true loss function is minimized, but this is not true for the four 
small models. The policy of targeting only real growth ( y) does not work well 
for any model. 
There is one odd result in Table 1 that should bc noted before proceeding 
further. When only U is targeted using Model V(m), QU actually increases (from 
1.59 to 1.65). In this model nz has little a&t on L’, and when only U is targeted, 
the value of m tends to go close to one of the bounds implied by the penalty 
terms in the loss function and to stay there for many periods. The penalty terms 
are in effect dominating the results9 The fact that m has little atl’ect on U in 
Table 1 
Results For the five mudelv and fire Iws functiuns 
QP,D QP Qti a Qy C;, CR z* 
Actual 2.04 2.41 1.59 3.91 3.93 2.72 0.89 ~ 
Mndei S(m) 
True 106s tilnct. l.67 2.03 1.21 4.22 4.49 2.70 ~ “.OlS 
Target only p 1.76 1.85 1.66 4.66 5.35 3.27 0.015 
Target only ” 2.36 3.27 0.67 4.78 3.95 2.32 - 0.015 
Target only x 1.88 2.00 1.67 3.50 3.62 0.34 ~ 0.015 
Target only y 2.68 3.68 0.91 4.64 3.39 1.07 0.015 
Model S(R) 
True loss funcr. 1.83 2.34 1.09 4.07 4.02 ~ 0.86 0.250 
Target Only p 1.84 2.10 1.53 3.94 4.22 -- I .08 0.2511 
Target only u 2.03 2.74 0.88 4.34 3.86 ~ 0.77 0.250 
?arget oniy x 1.90 2.05 1.73 3.79 4.08 - 0.95 0.25” 
Target only ) 2.59 3.31 1.57 4.66 3.65 ~ 0.25 0.250 
.wJde, V(m ) 
True loss funci. 1.48 1.7” 1.21 3.91 4.25 2.13 - 0.015 
Target oniy p i .4Y 1.67 1.29 4.12 4.59 2.92 ~ 0.015 
Target only L’ 2.36 2.90 1.65 4.06 3.58 0.74 ~ 0.015 
Target on@ I 1.64 1.85 1.41 3.37 3.63 2.53 0.015 
Target Dilly y 2.76 3.52 1.68 4.19 3.39 2.88 ~ 0.015 
Model V(m) can also be seen by comparing the results of minimizing the true 
loss function to those of targeting only p. These two sets of results are very 
close, which means that when the true loss function is being minimized, the only 
action is in controlling p. not L’. Because of this feature of Model V(m), little 
weight should be attached to the U results for this model. 
Continuing with the results in Table I, it is possible to use them to exam- 
ine the trade-off between unemployment variability (&) and inflation variability 
(QP), This trade-off is what Taylor (1979) calls a ‘second-order’ Phillips curve. 
Table I provides three points on this curve for each model. The weights on U 
and p are 0.5 and 0.5 for the true loss function, I.0 and 0.0 when only U is 
targeted, and 0.0 and 1.0 when only p is targeted. Table 2 presents for each 
model except V(m) the changes in QL~ and QP in going from zero weight on 
inflation (targeting only U) to zero weight on unemployment (targeting only p). 
(Model V(m) is excluded for the reasons discussed above.) For Model L(R) there 
is a 1.27 drop in unemployment variability at a cost of a 0.38 rise in inflation 
variability, a trade-off of 3.3 to 1 (1.27/0.38). The smallest trade-off is for Model 
S(m) of 0.7 to 1 (0.9911.42). The trade-offs for the other two models are about 
1 to 1. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, we are inclined to put more weight on the 
results for Model L(R) because it is likely to be more accurate. One of the main 
differences between L(R) and the small models concerns the trade-off between 
unemployment variability and inflation variability. The trade-off is much higher 
for L(R) 3.3 to 1 - than for the small models - about 1 to 1. Two other 
differences are that targeting inflation works fairly well for the small models, but 
not for L(R), and targeting unemployment works fairly well for L(R), but not 
for the small models. Two similarities are that targeting nominal growth does not 
work very well (except for Model S(R)) and targeting real growth does not work 
well. This first similarity suggests that the widely held view in the literature that 
targeting nominal growth is a good idea may not be right. 
Further details 
The figures in Table 1 hide many of the details of the results, and it is of 
interest to consider a few of these details. Fig. 1 shows plots of the actual and 
solution (hatted) values of p and U for Model S(R), along with the achxd 
and optimal values of R. The optimal and solution values are from the results 
of minimizing the expected value of the true loss function. Fig. 2 shows the 
same plots for Model L(R). For both models the optima correspond to higher 
unemployment rates in the 1960s and lower unemployment rates in the 1980s. 
To achieve this, the bill rates are higher in the 1960s and generally lower in the 
1980s. For L(R) there is little difference between the optimal and actual inflation 
rates, whereas for S(R) the optimal inflation rates are generally higher than the 
actual rates in the 1980s. These plots are, of course, consistent with the result in 
Table 1 that unemployment variability is lowered more than inflation variability 
Actual and Optimal Values of R 
AcChld ____ Opkn~l 
12 
ID 
Actual and Optimal Values of U 
- ActM ____ Optimal 
2 
Actual and Optimal Values of p 
12 
10 
Actual and Optimal Values of U 
_ A.3u.l ____OWmal 
2 
Actual and Optimal Values of p 
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when the expected value of the true loss function is minimized for Models S(R) 
and L(R). 
Another way to look at optimal control results is to examine feedback 
equations. For a linear model like S(R) and a quadratic objective function, the 
coefficients in the feedback equation can be obtained (using the solution values 
as data) by regressing the value of the policy instrument (R) on its lagged value 
and on ~~-1, pi_,. ~~-2, ~~~-3, U,_1, G-2, and a constant. These are the vari- 
ables in the optimal feedback equation. If bounds are imposed on the instrument, 
as is done here, the optimal feedback equation is no longer linear, and so the 
regression is only approximate. 
The regression using the solution values for Model S(R) for the minimization 
of the expected value of the true loss function is 
RI = 5.20 + O.O77y,+, + 0.234p,_, + 0.098~,_2 + 0.048+3 
-1.605&, + 0.747U,_z + 0.65lR,_1. (18) 
The fit of this regression is quite good (R* = 0.991), which suggests that the 
approximation is good. The coefficients on the y and p values show that the 
interest rate responds positively to output growth and inflation. The unemployment 
terms can be written - 0.858U,_, - 0.747(c5_1 -U-z), and so the unemployment 
coefficients show that the interest rate responds negatively to both the level and 
change of the unemployment rate. When Eq. (18) was used in place of solving 
the 126 deterministic control problems, the value of QP;G was the same to two 
decimal places as the value in Table 1 (1.X3), and so the equation is obviously 
a good approximation to the true feedback equation. 
What about a feedback equation for Model L(R)? The model is nonlinear, and 
so even ignoring the penalty terms in the loss function, the feedback equation is 
nonlinear. Also, there are over a hundred predetermined variables in the model, 
and so the feedback equation is huge. It may be, however, that, even though the 
true feedback equation is nonlinear and large, a few right-hand-side variables 
provide a good approximation. To check this, a number of regressions were run 
(using the solution values as data) with the policy instrument (R) on the left-hand 
side and various variables on the right-hand side. The aim was to tind variables 
that contributed significantly to the fit. The following, quite simple, equation 
tuned out to give a good fit: 
R, = 1.40 + 1.353R,_, ~ 0.387Rl_2 + O.O544(4OOY,_,) 
-0.0549(400Y,_z), (19) 
where Y is the log of real output. This regression has an R* of 0.980. This 
equation roughly says that AR, = 1.4 i- 0.35~!.N+~ + 0.055~,-,, where ~~-1, 
the growth rate of real output in period t ~ 1, equals 400(Y,_i - K--?). This 
rule simply says that change in the policy instrument depends positively on its 
previous change and on the lagged real growth rate. Other variables, includ- 
ing lagged values of P and U, that were added to Eq. (19) tended not to be 
significant. It may be with more diligent searching that other variables could 
be found for inclusion in (19), but for present purposes we have stopped with 
(19). 
When Eq. (19) was used in place of solving the 126 deterministic control 
problems for model L(R), the value of Qr,cv was 2.03, which compares to the 
optimal value of 1.96 in Table 1. The loss is thus 3.6 percent higher using (19). 
This suggests that (19) is not a bad approximation, and an argument might be 
made for using it on grounds of simplicity On the other hand, the extra computer 
cost in performing the complete optimization is trivial, and so the 3.6 percent 
increase in loss could not be justified on computational grounds. It is, however, 
interesting that the simple equation does as well as it does, and this might be an 
area for future work. 
8. Stochastic simulation 
The variability measures in Table 1 do not require stochastic simulation they 
are based on the use of the historical shocks. Although for historical comparisons 
these are the most appropriate shocks to use, it is interesting to consider how 
alternative measures could be computed using stochastic simulation. 
Consider the use of the above numerical procedure and Model L(R). There 
are 29 stochastic equations in L(R), and the length of the control period is 126 
quarters. The results in a given row in Table I for L(R) are thus based on 
126x29 = 3654 historical error terms. (After each of the 126 solutions of the 
deterministic control problem, 29 error terms are used.) A stochastic-simulation 
alternative to the use of the historical error terms is as follows. 1) Using the 
estimated distribution of the structural error terms, draw 29 error terms 126 times. 
2) Go through the entire numerical procedure as above, using the drawn error 
terms instead of the historical error terms. This yields a value of Qy for each 
variable 4 (as in Table 1). 3) Do steps 1) and 2) J times, where J may be 
around 100. This gives .J values of Q4, from which its mean, variance, and other 
statistics can be computed. The means of Q4 would be alternatives to the values 
in Table I, and they could be compared across loss functions. 
What would correspond to the ‘Actual’ row in Table 1 when stochastic sim- 
ulation was used’? The most obvious possibility for Model L(R) would be to 
use the estimated interest rate reaction function discussed above as the monetary 
policy rule. This is the rule the Fed is estimated to have followed historically. For 
Model I’(R) it would be the estimated equation for R. Stochastic simulation is 
easy to do numerically in this case because the rule replaces the need to compute 
the optimal values of R. Each repetition involves solving the model with the rule 
for the particular set of error terms drawn. ” The mean value of Qy from this 
exercise could then be compared to the other mean values. 
Since it takes about 12 hours of computer time to compute one value of Q,, for 
Model L(R), computing, say, 100 values is not yet practical. One could. however, 
experiment with smaller models at the present time, and computer chips are 
getting faster. In the future it will be interesting to see if the conclusions reached 
from Table I are sensitive to the use of stochastic simulation. 
Finally, one could also draw coefficients as well as error terms for the stochastic 
simulations. For each repetition (i.e., each draw of the 126x29 error terms) one 
would draw a set of coefficients from an estimated distribution. The results with 
and without drawing coeficients could then be compared. This would be a way 
of examining how robust the conclusions are to alternative versions of the model, 
the alternative versions in this case being alternative sets of coefficients. 
9. Conclusion 
The conclusions from the results in Table I have been presented in Section 7; 
and they will not be repeated here. The numerical procedure presented in Section 
3 is general enough to handle a variety of loss functions and models. The loss 
functions need not even be quadratic. Given that a number of the conclusions that 
hold for Model L(R) do not hold for the small models, it would be of interest 
in future work to try other models, particularly other large structural models. 
The results in Fair (1994, pp. 32&328) suggest that monetary policy is becom- 
ing less effective for a given change in interest rates because of the growing size 
of the federal government debt. Most of the debt is financed by the household 
sector, and the larger is the debt, the larger is the change in interest revenue of 
the household sector for a given change in interest rates. As noted in the discus- 
sion of Model L(R) in Section 6, a fall in interest revenue from a fall in interest 
rates has, other things being equal, a negative effect on household expenditures, 
and this offsets part of the other (positive) effects on expenditures of a decrease 
in interest rates. The size of this offset is getting larger over time because of the 
growing size of the government debt, and so on net monetary policy is becoming 
less effective in the sense that there is a smaller change in output for a given 
change in the interest rate. The less effective monetary policy becomes in this 
sense, the less able will the Fed be to minimize any loss function that penalizes 
changes in the interest rate. The Fed may thus do less well in the future. 
R. C Fair, E.P F-li,wre~~iJournai o/ .Mnnerury Econnmiir 38 (IY%,i 173-193 193 
Another issue that can be analyzed using the numerical procedure in Section 
3 is targeting levels versus targeting growth rates in the loss function. (As noted 
above, the loss function can be quite general.) One loss function might be squared 
deviations of real output from some mcaswe of potential output, and another 
might be squared deviations of the price level from a target price level that 
grows at, say. one or two percent per year. In the process of writing this paper. 
some early experimentation ws done using these types of loss functions, but 
for present purposes it was decided to stay with the loss functions in terms 
of growth rates. An added complication when using loss functions in levels is 
pushing the economy into situations that are substantially different from what 
existed historically. In a model like L(R), this can have large cumulative etl’ects 
and change both the real stock and financial stock variables substantially. It is 
always dangerous to push a model too far Tom historical experience. and using 
loss functions in levels sometimes does this. At any rate, further experimentation 
with alternative loss functions would be of interest. At a minimum, it might be 
of interest to experiment with loss functions like (3) and (4) in which the target 
values for Jo and U were not necessarily constant throughout the whole period. 
